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Abstract
Background
Financial incentives promote many health behaviors, but effective ways to deliver health incentives remain
uncertain.
Methods
We randomly assigned CVS Caremark employees and their relatives and friends to one of four incentive
programs or to usual care for smoking cessation. Two of the incentive programs targeted individuals, and two
targeted groups of six participants. One of the individual-oriented programs and one of the group-oriented
programs entailed rewards of approximately $800 for smoking cessation; the others entailed refundable
deposits of $150 plus $650 in reward payments for successful participants. Usual care included informational
resources and free smoking-cessation aids.
Results
Overall, 2538 participants were enrolled. Of those assigned to reward-based programs, 90.0% accepted this
assignment, as compared with 13.7% of those assigned to deposit-based programs (P
Conclusions
Reward-based programs were much more commonly accepted than deposit-based programs, leading to higher
rates of sustained abstinence from smoking. Group-oriented incentive programs were no more effective than
individual-oriented programs.
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BACKGROUND
Financial incentives promote many health behaviors, but effective ways to deliver 
health incentives remain uncertain.
METHODS
We randomly assigned CVS Caremark employees and their relatives and friends to 
one of four incentive programs or to usual care for smoking cessation. Two of the 
incentive programs targeted individuals, and two targeted groups of six partici-
pants. One of the individual-oriented programs and one of the group-oriented 
programs entailed rewards of approximately $800 for smoking cessation; the oth-
ers entailed refundable deposits of $150 plus $650 in reward payments for success-
ful participants. Usual care included informational resources and free smoking-
cessation aids.
RESULTS
Overall, 2538 participants were enrolled. Of those assigned to reward-based pro-
grams, 90.0% accepted the assignment, as compared with 13.7% of those assigned 
to deposit-based programs (P<0.001). In intention-to-treat analyses, rates of sus-
tained abstinence from smoking through 6 months were higher with each of the 
four incentive programs (range, 9.4 to 16.0%) than with usual care (6.0%) (P<0.05 
for all comparisons); the superiority of reward-based programs was sustained 
through 12 months. Group-oriented and individual-oriented programs were as-
sociated with similar 6-month abstinence rates (13.7% and 12.1%, respectively; 
P = 0.29). Reward-based programs were associated with higher abstinence rates 
than deposit-based programs (15.7% vs. 10.2%, P<0.001). However, in instrumen-
tal-variable analyses that accounted for differential acceptance, the rate of absti-
nence at 6 months was 13.2 percentage points (95% confidence interval, 3.1 to 
22.8) higher in the deposit-based programs than in the reward-based programs 
among the estimated 13.7% of the participants who would accept participation in 
either type of program.
CONCLUSIONS
Reward-based programs were much more commonly accepted than deposit-based 
programs, leading to higher rates of sustained abstinence from smoking. Group-
oriented incentive programs were no more effective than individual-oriented 
programs. (Funded by the National Institutes of Health and CVS Caremark; 
ClinicalTrials.gov number, NCT01526265.)
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Financial incentives have been shown to promote a variety of health behaviors.1-8 For example, in a randomized, clinical 
trial involving 878 General Electric employees, a 
bundle of incentives worth $750 for smoking 
cessation nearly tripled quit rates, from 5.0% to 
14.7%,8 and led to a program adapted by Gen-
eral Electric for its U.S. employees.9 Although in-
centive programs are increasingly used by gov-
ernments, employers, and insurers to motivate 
changes in health behavior,10,11 their design is 
usually based on the traditional economic as-
sumption that the size of the incentive deter-
mines its effectiveness. In contrast, behavioral 
economic theory suggests that incentives of 
similar size may have very different effects de-
pending on how they are designed.12
For example, deposit or “commitment” con-
tracts, whereby participants put some of their 
own money at risk and recoup it if they are suc-
cessful in changing their behavior, have been 
used in a variety of online and employer-based 
behavioral-change programs. Because people are 
typically more motivated to avoid losses than to 
seek gains,13 deposit contracts should be more 
successful than reward programs. However, the 
need to make deposits may deter people from 
participating, and the overall effectiveness of 
deposit and reward programs has not been com-
pared.14,15
Furthermore, incentives that target groups 
may be more effective than incentives that target 
individuals because people are strongly motivated 
by social comparisons.16-18 Collaborative incen-
tives, whereby payments to successful group 
members increase with the overall success of the 
group, may add dimensions of interpersonal ac-
countability and teamwork.19 Competitive de-
signs, such as pari-mutuel schemes in which 
money deposited by group members who do not 
change their behavior gets distributed to group 
members who do, may amplify peoples’ aver-
sions to loss by highlighting the regret they 
may feel if others benefit from their failure to 
change.20,21
We therefore evaluated incentive programs 
for smoking cessation that are based on re-
wards or deposit contracts and that are deliv-
ered at the individual or group level, comparing 
the interventions on three measures: accep-
tance, defined as the proportion of people who 
accept the incentive program when offered; 
overall effectiveness, assessed as the proportion 
of people offered each program who stop smok-
ing; and efficacy, assessed as the proportion of 
people who stop smoking if they accept a given 
incentive program.
Me thods
Trial Design
We conducted a five-group randomized, con-
trolled trial comparing usual care with four in-
centive programs aimed at promoting sustained 
abstinence from smoking. The protocol (avail-
able with the full text of this article at NEJM.org) 
was approved by the institutional review board 
at the University of Pennsylvania. The first au-
thor vouches for the accuracy and completeness 
of the data and for the fidelity of the study to the 
protocol.
Study Population
We used a multifaceted recruitment scheme 
(Fig. S1 in the Supplementary Appendix, avail-
able at NEJM.org) to enroll CVS Caremark em-
ployees or their relatives and friends across the 
United States. Eligible participants were at least 
18 years of age, reported smoking at least 5 ciga-
rettes per day, had Internet access, and indi-
cated an interest in learning about ways to stop 
smoking. Recruitment occurred from February 
2012 through October 2012. Using the Way to 
Health Web-based research portal created for 
this and other studies,22 participants opened an 
account, electronically signed the informed-
consent document, and completed a baseline 
questionnaire. Participants were told that they 
would be paid for completing questionnaires 
and submitting samples to confirm smoking 
abstinence and that the study tested different 
ways of providing financial incentives to pro-
mote cessation. To dissuade nonsmokers from 
enrolling, we also informed potential participants 
that we would randomly screen for baseline 
smoking.
After randomization, participants learned the 
details of their assigned intervention, were asked 
to accept or decline their intervention, and chose 
a target quit date between 1 and 90 days after 
enrollment. We then selected a random sample 
of 5% of these enrolled participants to undergo 
baseline cotinine screening and offered $100 for 
completing a cotinine assay.
A Quick Take 
summary is 
 available at 
NEJM.org
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Randomization and Interventions
Participants were randomly assigned on an indi-
vidual basis to one of five groups (Fig. 1). Ran-
domization was stratified according to two di-
chotomous variables: whether participants had 
full health care benefits through CVS Caremark 
and whether their annual household income was 
at least $60,000 (the CVS Caremark workforce 
median) or less than $60,000. We developed an 
adaptive randomization algorithm23-26 that up-
dated the assignment probabilities to the five 
groups after every third enrolled participant. 
Updated probabilities reflected the inverse of the 
proportion of participants assigned to that group 
who accepted the intervention, relative to total 
acceptance across groups.26 This approach bal-
ances recruitment of accepting participants 
across groups by increasing the odds of random-
ization to interventions that previous participants 
declined.
All the participants were offered usual care, 
consisting of information about local smoking-
cessation resources, cessation guides produced by 
the American Cancer Society, and, for the 41% of 
the participants receiving health benefits through 
CVS Caremark, free access to a behavioral-modifi-
cation program and nicotine-replacement therapy. 
Participants assigned to the two individual-incen-
tive groups were also eligible to receive $200 if 
they had biochemically confirmed abstinence 
at each of three times: 14 days, 30 days, and 
6 months after their target quit dates. Participants 
would get an additional $200 bonus at 6 months, 
for a total of $800 (Fig. S2 in the Supplementary 
Appendix). In the individual-deposit group, this 
sum included a $150 deposit that would be re-
funded to participants who quit smoking.
In the collaborative-reward and competitive-
deposit groups, cohorts of six smokers each were 
formed on a rolling basis, linking participants 
Figure 1. Assessment for Eligibility and Randomization.
2538 Underwent randomization
4629 Persons created Way to Health
account
612 Were excluded
10 Were <18 yr of age
84 Smoked <5 cigarettes/day
54 Smoked <6 mo
38 Did not have Internet access
426 Were not CVS Caremark 
employees or their relatives 
or friends
4017 Were eligible
1479 Did not complete enrollment
52 Did not provide consent
55 Would not give Social 
Security number
1372 Did not complete baseline
survey
468 Were assigned
to usual care
468 Were included
in primary analysis
471 Were assigned to
competitive deposit
471 Were included
in primary analysis
582 Were assigned to
individual deposit
582 Were included
in primary analysis
519 Were assigned to
collaborative reward
519 Were included
in primary analysis
498 Were assigned
to individual reward
498 Were included
in primary analysis
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who selected quit dates nearest each other. In the 
collaborative-reward group, payments to success-
ful group members at each time point increased 
with increasing group success rates, from $100 
per time point if one participant quit to $600 per 
time point per participant if all six quit. We 
sought to foster collaboration among participants 
with the use of a Web-based chat room through 
which they could communicate throughout the 
study.
In the competitive-deposit group, $150 depos-
its from each of six group members, plus a $450 
matching reward per member ($3,600 total), was 
redistributed among members who quit at each 
time point. For example, if only two participants 
in a group quit at 14 days but returned to smok-
ing by 30 days, those two participants would 
receive $600 each at 14 days, and there would be 
no further payouts to the members of that group. 
Members of competitive cohorts received accu-
rate but anonymous descriptions of their com-
petitors to make vivid the possibility that others 
might benefit from their own lack of change21 
without enabling participants to undermine a 
competitor’s efforts.
Participants in the group-incentive groups 
were also given a $200 bonus if they sustained 
abstinence through 6 months. Thus, the four 
interventions differed in how incentives would 
accrue and be disbursed (Fig. S2 in the Supple-
mentary Appendix), but the payment schedule 
and bonus were identical, and on the basis of 
anticipated success rates, we estimated that each 
intervention carried an expected value of $800.
Outcomes
The primary outcome was sustained abstinence 
from smoking for 6 months after the target quit 
date.27 Achievement of sustained abstinence re-
quired that submitted saliva samples had a coti-
nine concentration of less than 10 ng per milli-
liter28 at 14 days, 30 days, and 6 months. For 
users of nicotine-replacement therapy, a urinary 
sample with an anabasine concentration of less 
than 3 ng per milliliter was considered to show 
sustained abstinence.29 Participants who did not 
submit samples were coded as actively smoking. 
Secondary outcomes included the initial quit 
rate at 14 days, sustained abstinence for 30 days, 
and sustained abstinence through 12 months 
(i.e., 6 months after the final incentive disburse-
ment).
Incentive acceptance rates reflected the pro-
portion of participants assigned to that incentive 
who agreed to the contract. In the two groups 
requiring deposits, we considered participants to 
have accepted the intervention if they made $150 
deposits by credit or debit card within 60 days 
after enrollment or before their selected quit 
date, whichever came first. Consenting partici-
pants who declined their assigned program 
remained in their assigned group for intention-
to-treat analyses and were treated identically to 
those in the usual-care group.
Statistical Analysis
We specified three analyses corresponding to 
the aims of the study. First, we used logistic re-
gression to compare acceptance of the interven-
tions, adjusting for the two variables according 
to which the randomization was stratified.30 Sec-
ond, we conducted intention-to-treat analyses 
using logistic regression to compare the effec-
tiveness of incentive programs among all ran-
domly assigned participants. Third, we com-
pared the efficacy of the interventions. We first 
conducted traditional per-protocol analyses, com-
paring groups of participants who accepted dif-
ferent interventions. However, because such 
analyses are subject to selection biases,31 our 
primary approach to measure efficacy modeled 
the randomization group as an instrumental 
variable32,33 in analyses of the complier average 
treatment effect.34-36 These analyses, described in 
detail in the Supplementary Appendix, used data 
on all randomly assigned participants to estimate 
treatment effects for participants who would have 
accepted each intervention.
We estimated that a sample of 2185 partici-
pants would provide 80% power to detect abso-
lute differences of at least 7.5 percentage points 
in the rate of sustained abstinence between any 
one of the three novel incentive programs and 
the individual-reward program. Details of this 
calculation are provided in the Supplementary 
Appendix.
R esult s
Patient Characteristics
Overall, 2538 participants were enrolled. The 
demographic and smoking-related characteristics 
of the participants were balanced across the five 
study groups (Table 1).
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Characteristic
Usual Care 
(N = 468)
Individual 
Reward 
(N = 498)
Collaborative 
Reward  
(N = 519)
Individual 
Deposit 
(N = 582)
Competitive 
Deposit  
(N = 471)
Demographic characteristics
Age — yr
Median 34 32 32 33 33
Interquartile range 26–47 25–46 25–45 25–48 25–45
Female sex — no. (%) 300 (64) 312 (63) 322 (62) 367 (63) 293 (62)
Race — no. (%)†
White 365 (78) 409 (82) 387 (75) 452 (78) 376 (80)
Black 43 (9) 44 (9) 58 (11) 54 (9) 49 (10)
Other 60 (13) 45 (9) 74 (14) 76 (13) 46 (10)
Years of education‡
Median 13 13 13 13 13
Interquartile range 12–14 12–14 12–15 12–15 12–15
Annual household income — no. (%)
<$60,000 346 (74) 375 (75) 382 (74) 403 (69) 358 (76)
≥$60,000 122 (26) 123 (25) 137 (26) 179 (31) 113 (24)
Health insurance — no. (%)§
CVS Caremark employee
Enrolled in CVS Caremark health care plan 152 (32) 174 (35) 177 (34) 213 (37) 168 (36)
Not enrolled in CVS Caremark health care plan 139 (30) 136 (27) 151 (29) 180 (31) 146 (31)
Relative or friend of CVS Caremark employee
Enrolled in CVS Caremark health care plan 36 (8) 33 (7) 26 (5) 29 (5) 36 (8)
Not enrolled in CVS Caremark health care plan 141 (30) 155 (31) 165 (32) 160 (27) 121 (26)
Smoking history
No. of cigarettes smoked per day
Median 15 15 15 15 15
Interquartile range 10–20 10–20 9–20 10–20 10–20
Duration of regular smoking — yr
Median 15 12 13 14 14
Interquartile range 6–26 6–25 6–25 6–25 7–25
Age at first smoking — yr
Median 17 17 17 17 17
Interquartile range 15–19 15–19 15–19 15–19 15–19
Level of nicotine dependence — no. (%)¶
Low 101 (22) 111 (22) 118 (23) 122 (21) 95 (20)
Low to moderate 148 (32) 155 (31) 152 (29) 185 (32) 141 (30)
Moderate 194 (41) 210 (42) 229 (44) 251 (43) 215 (46)
High 25 (5) 22 (4) 20 (4) 24 (4) 20 (4)
Stage of change — no. (%)‖
Preparation 300 (64) 312 (63) 327 (63) 372 (64) 312 (66)
Contemplation 168 (36) 186 (37) 192 (37) 210 (36) 158 (34)
Successfully quit for a 24-hr period in past year — no. (%) 300 (64) 307 (62) 328 (63) 361 (62) 294 (62)
Table 1. Participant Characteristics (Intention-to-Treat Population).*
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Acceptance of Interventions
Of 2070 participants assigned to one of the four 
intervention groups, 1060 (51.2%) accepted that 
intervention. Participants were much more likely 
to accept the two reward-based incentive pro-
grams (combined acceptance rate, 90.0%) than 
the two deposit-based programs (combined ac-
ceptance rate, 13.7%) (P<0.001) (Fig. 2). Partici-
pants were similarly likely to accept the individu-
al incentives (combined acceptance rate, 50.6%) 
and the group incentives (combined acceptance 
rate, 51.9%) (P = 0.55).
Effectiveness and Costs of Interventions
Median payouts to participants who stopped smok-
ing in the four incentive groups were similar 
(Table S1 in the Supplementary Appendix). In 
intention-to-treat analyses, all four programs 
yielded greater rates of sustained abstinence 
from smoking through 6 months (range, 9.4 to 
16.0%) than did usual care (6.0%) (P<0.05 for all 
comparisons) (Fig. 3, and Table S2 in the Supple-
mentary Appendix). At 12 months (6 months after 
the cessation of incentives), roughly half the par-
ticipants who were abstinent through 6 months 
in all groups submitted negative cotinine assays, 
and only the reward-based incentive programs 
remained superior to usual care (Fig. 3). The 
proportion of self-reported quitters who submit-
ted a cotinine sample was lower at 12 months 
than at 30 days or 6 months in all groups (Table 
S3 in the Supplementary Appendix). In secondary 
analyses of self-reported abstinence at 12 months, 
relapsed smoking was much less common than 
in analyses requiring biochemical confirmation, 
and all incentive groups remained superior to 
usual care (Table S2 in the Supplementary Ap-
pendix).
At 6 months, the proportion of participants 
with sustained abstinence was greater with re-
ward-based incentives (15.7%) than with deposit-
based incentives (10.2%) (P<0.001) (Table S4 in 
the Supplementary Appendix) and was similar 
between participants assigned to individual- 
incentive programs and those assigned to group-
incentive programs (12.1% vs. 13.7%, P = 0.29) 
(Table S5 in the Supplementary Appendix). Par-
ticipants with access to free pharmacologic ces-
sation aids through their CVS Caremark benefits 
did not have higher abstinence rates than partici-
pants without such benefits (Table S6 in the 
Supplementary Appendix). Total costs spent per 
participant who had sustained abstinence were 
lower in the deposit-based groups than in the 
reward-based groups (Fig. S3 in the Supplemen-
tary Appendix).
Efficacy of Interventions
Given the similar effectiveness of individual re-
wards and collaborative rewards and of individ-
Characteristic
Usual Care 
(N = 468)
Individual 
Reward 
(N = 498)
Collaborative 
Reward  
(N = 519)
Individual 
Deposit 
(N = 582)
Competitive 
Deposit  
(N = 471)
Ever used NRT or assistance to quit smoking — no. (%) 340 (73) 384 (77) 384 (74) 421 (72) 350 (74)
Currently using other methods to quit smoking — no. (%)** 65 (14) 51 (10) 71 (14) 73 (13) 47 (10)
*  The intention-to-treat population includes all participants who underwent randomization to the five study groups. There were no sig-
nificant differences between the study groups in any of the baseline characteristics listed (P>0.05). NRT denotes nicotine-replacement 
therapy.
†  Race was self-reported.
‡  Years of education range from grade 1 to 17, with 17 representing “at least some graduate school” and 13 to 16 representing 1 to 4 years 
of college.
§  The CVS Caremark health care plan includes free access to a behavioral-modification program and NRT.
¶  The level of dependence is based on the score on the Fagerström Test for Nicotine Dependence. Scores range from 1 to 10, with higher 
scores indicating a more intense physical dependence on nicotine. Low dependence corresponds to a score of 1 or 2, low-to-moderate de-
pendence a score of 3 or 4, moderate dependence a score of 5 to 7, and high dependence a score of 8 to 10.
‖  The participants were asked, “Are you seriously thinking of quitting smoking?” and were given three options to select: yes, within the next 
30 days (preparation stage); yes, within the next 6 months (contemplation stage); or no, not thinking of quitting (precontemplation 
stage). The values for contemplation stage include 10 participants in the precontemplation stage: 2 participants in the usual-care group, 
2 participants in the individual-reward group, 2 participants in the collaborative-reward group, 3 participants in the individual-deposit group, 
and 1 participant in the competitive-deposit group. Data were missing for 1 participant in the competitive-deposit group.
**  Participant is currently using NRT, behavioral therapy, prescription medication, or other method to quit smoking.
Table 1. (Continued.)
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ual deposits and competitive deposits, we grouped 
the reward-based incentives as well as the de-
posit-based incentives for efficacy analyses. In 
standard per-protocol analyses, 52.3% of those 
who accepted deposits versus 17.1% of those who 
accepted rewards had sustained abstinence through 
6 months (P<0.001), and similarly large differ-
ences were observed at all time points (Table S7 
in the Supplementary Appendix). In analyses of 
the complier average treatment effect, which ad-
just for the selection effects inherent in per-proto-
col analyses, the rate of abstinence at 6 months 
was 13.2 percentage points (95% confidence in-
terval, 3.1 to 22.8) higher in the deposit-based 
programs than in the reward-based programs 
among the 13.7% of smokers who would accept 
either type of incentive (Table 2). According to 
this approach, deposits were superior to rewards 
even if we assumed that participants who would 
accept deposits had up to 12.5 times greater 
underlying propensities to stop smoking than 
participants who would accept rewards only.
Analyses Accounting for Enrollment  
of Potential Nonsmokers
Among 150 participants asked to submit a coti-
nine assay at baseline to confirm smoking sta-
tus, 9 (6.0%) submitted negative assays and 21 
(14.0%) did not return assays. These rates were 
similar across groups (Table S8 in the Supple-
mentary Appendix), and sensitivity analyses ad-
justing for the possibility that up to 20% of the 
participants were not smokers revealed nearly 
identical estimates of effectiveness (Table S9 in 
the Supplementary Appendix).
Discussion
More than 50 years after the release of the first 
Surgeon General’s report on the harmful effects 
of smoking, national policies, behavioral pro-
grams, and pharmacologic approaches have helped 
reduce smoking rates in the United States.37 
However, the need for new approaches is clear 
because smoking remains the leading cause of 
preventable illness and death.38,39
In this large randomized trial across the 
United States, we found that four different in-
centive programs with expected values of $800 
were each effective in promoting sustained ab-
stinence from smoking. Perhaps the most im-
portant finding is that incentive programs that 
required people to deposit $150 of their own 
money were less effective overall than reward-
based programs of similar value because few 
people accepted such deposit programs. This was 
true despite the $650 reward offered to deposit-
arm participants in addition to the return of their 
original $150 deposits. However, analyses that 
account for the different acceptance rates of the 
interventions showed that deposit-based incen-
tives were substantially more efficacious than 
reward-based incentives among people who would 
have accepted either. The robustness of this result 
to reasonably large potential selection effects sug-
gests that incentives that build on participants’ 
loss aversion13 may meaningfully change behavior.
Second, we found that group-oriented reward 
programs were not significantly more effective 
than individual-oriented programs. The results 
of this large trial are therefore consistent with 
those of small randomized, controlled trials of 
incentives for weight loss in which group-oriented 
Figure 2. Acceptance Rates of Financial-Incentive Structures.
Acceptance rates were adjusted for two stratifying variables30: whether partic-
ipants received their health insurance through CVS Caremark and whether 
their annual household income was at least $60,000 or less than $60,000.  
I bars denote 95% confidence intervals. In parentheses, the numerator indi-
cates the number of participants accepting each intervention, and the denomi-
nator indicates the number of participants assigned to each intervention. 
The usual-care group is not shown, because there was no option to decline 
usual care.
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payments, as compared with individual-oriented 
payments, produced small early benefits that 
were not sustained over time.19,22
Finally, the finding that individual rewards of 
$800, as compared with usual care, nearly tri-
pled the rate of smoking cessation among CVS 
Caremark employees and their friends and fam-
ily confirms and extends the generalizability of 
our finding from a previous trial involving Gen-
eral Electric employees.8 In addition to the pub-
lic health effects of such smoking reductions, 
these findings are important for employers. Be-
cause employing a smoker is estimated to cost 
$5,816 more each year than employing a non-
smoker,40 even an $800 payment borne entirely 
by employers and paid only to those who quit 
would be highly cost-saving.
This study has limitations. First, the low rate 
of acceptance of the deposit programs required 
protocol modifications to restrict the propor-
tions of participants who would be randomly 
assigned to those groups. Implementing these 
limitations preserved balance in participant char-
acteristics across groups and preserved power 
for all effectiveness analyses but limited the 
precision of analyses comparing the efficacy of 
reward and deposit groups. Second, only 41% of 
the participants had access to free pharmaco-
logic and behavioral cessation aids through their 
employee benefits. However, smoking-cessation 
rates were not higher among those with access 
to such aids, a finding that suggests that the 
superiority of incentives would hold in popula-
tions with universal access. Third, in all trial 
groups, nearly half the smokers who quit at the 
end of the intervention at 6 months did not 
document sustained abstinence through 12 
months. This suggests similar durability of fi-
nancial incentives to nicotine-replacement ther-
apy and bupropion, for which relapse after 
completion of treatment has also occurred in 
roughly 50% of the participants.41,42 Secondary 
analyses suggest that the true relapse rates in 
our trial may have been lower, given the reduc-
tion in submission of any samples at 12 months 
across groups (Table S3 in the Supplementary 
Appendix).
This study also has several strengths. In ad-
dition to comparing financial incentives for 
smoking cessation in a large number of partici-
pants, the trial measured the specific contribu-
tions of acceptance and efficacy of the interven-
tions to their overall effectiveness. This trial also 
compared multiple incentive programs with de-
sign features based on behavioral economic 
theory, including repeated payments to reinforce 
target behaviors,43 bonus payments at the end of 
the intervention to offset smokers’ tendencies to 
discount the importance of future events,44,45 and 
the provision of ongoing feedback regarding 
participants’ accrued gains and losses contin-
gent on their self-reported smoking status to 
maximize the effect of regret aversion.20,21 Fi-
nally, this trial randomly selected participants 
for screening cotinine tests to prevent nonsmok-
ers from enrolling. The robustness of our find-
ings in analyses accounting for potential par-
ticipation of nonsmokers provides strong 
evidence regarding the effectiveness of incen-
tives.
Figure 3. Rates of Sustained Abstinence from Smoking at 6 and 12 Months 
after Target Quit Date.
The primary outcome was sustained abstinence through 6 months. Aster-
isks indicate P values (* for P<0.05, ** for P<0.01, and *** for P<0.001) for 
the comparison of the four intervention groups to usual care, with adjust-
ment for the two stratifying variables30: whether participants received their 
health insurance through CVS Caremark and whether their annual house-
hold income was at least $60,000 or less than $60,000. I bars indicate 95% 
confidence intervals.
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T h e  n e w  e ngl a nd  j o u r na l  o f  m e dic i n e
In summary, this trial shows that among 
several financial-incentive programs for smok-
ing cessation, rewards for smoking cessation are 
more effective overall than are deposit-based 
contracts owing to their much higher rate of ac-
ceptance. In addition, the efficacy of deposit-
based contracts among those who use them and 
the cost-effectiveness of such contracts for em-
ployers suggest that future innovations in em-
ployee benefit design should seek to establish 
the effectiveness of smoking-cessation programs 
requiring deposits smaller than the $150 used in 
this trial.
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